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Soon we will mark the fifth anniversary ofthe September 11, 2001 attacks, and withit the fifth anniversary of the War on
Terror. The good news is that the United States
has not suffered a comparable blow since that
terrible day; the bad news is that our govern-
ment still lacks a proper understanding of our
enemies and what motivates them. That, in
turn, is a major reason why the end of this war
is nowhere in sight: After all, how can we know
if we have defeated an enemy we cannot ade-
quately define? 
Our difficulty in understanding what we are
up against flows from the fact that we have no
obvious precedent for this Islamist enemy (but
there are non-obvious precedents, of which
more below). So American policymakers and
policy intellectuals, most of whom know little
about Islamic and Arab history or modern trib-
al societies, usually default to reasoning by anal-
ogy from historical cases they do know. That is
one reason the post-World War II histories of
Germany and Japan were so often analogized to
Iraq, and why some thought that liberated
Iraqis would react more or less as liberated
Poles, Czechs and Hungarians did in 1989.
That is why, too, we often hear comparisons
between the Cold War and the War on Terror,
and debates about the accomplishments of the
Truman and Bush Administration in circum-
stances presumed to be similar. 
One common view in the Bush
Administration and among many Americans is
that Muslims are oppressed. Liberate them
from authoritarianism, from poverty and job-
lessness, from puritanical interpretations of
Islam and a sexist division of labor, and they
will no longer be so envious of us, so frustrated
or so violent. Implicit here is the notion that
they will also become more modern if not more
Western, and that that will help, too. Surely
they are right that millions of Muslims would
like more freedoms. But which freedoms, and
to what degree? And do all Muslims want for
other Muslims of every sect and sex what they
want for themselves? This is a far more con-
tentious issue than many seem to realize—as
the dissolution of Iraq happening before our
very eyes demonstrates. 
Push harder on the analogies to the Cold
War and it is easy to find other troubling dis-
crepancies. For instance, the Cold War not only
stayed cold between the Soviets and ourselves,
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but there was also a fairly clear etiquette to how
each used proxies. Both sides also understood
what the other was after. There were, in other
words, inherent symmetries within the struggle.
No such equivalences exist between Islamists
and us. We cannot even say who or what exact-
ly comprises a side.
This conflict is not a contest between two
command economies or two different methods
of governance. As committed as many Islamists
are to achieving social justice and improving
social welfare according to religious prescripts,
they do not just seek to better Muslims’ lives in
this world. The fate of souls in the world to
come, as well as the future of Islam itself, mat-
ter just as much and, for some, very much
more. On the one hand, we keenly appreciate
the apocalyptic stakes involved should terrorists
get their hands on weapons of mass destruction,
but on the other, we gloss over the possibility
that Islamists want to do us grave harm out of
deep spiritual conviction. It is easier and more
politic to boil the problem down to inequities
rather than iniquity. Most of us can understand
why young Muslim males might be angry as
they face futures in which they cannot afford
wives and cannot expect ever to have decent
jobs. Tying their anger to emasculation and vice
versa makes their violence more comprehensi-
ble to us, and we can potentially do something
about their poverty and lack of opportunity,
just as we may be able to help ameliorate con-
ditions of tyranny and corruption over time.
This understanding fits our intellectual frame-
work, yes—but it is dangerously incomplete.
Because, too, most of those in policymaking
and policy-advising circles are more familiar
with the precepts of political science and eco-
nomics than with anthropology, promoting
good governance is bound to seem like the right
response. Only when one notices the structural
conditions underlying economic and political
dysfunction is it clear that this will hardly suf-
fice. Without question, poverty and authoritar-
ianism act as enablers of Islamist terrorism. But
what of other enablers? What about Islam itself,
and the ongoing collision between Islam and
what we somewhat casually call “the West”? 
That is the collision we must examine.
When we do, we will see that the Islamist chal-
lenge is something more, but also nothing less,
than a nativist reaction to Westernization. The
encroachment of Western mores and our push
for social and economic change worldwide all
threaten corporate Muslim identity—group
identity, in other words—in Islamists’ eyes.
Not all Muslims oppose Westernization, but
those who do I will call “nativists.” They not
only do not want to Westernize, they also
actively oppose accommodationist Muslims
who, by succumbing to the West, threaten the
integrity of Islam itself. This, in essence, is what
we are up against: They want to expunge us;
we, in turn, don’t seem to realize how
omnipresent and troubling we are.
Nativism is hardly a new phenomenon.History is full of instances of violent
reactions to changes introduced from without,
and in virtually all cases, religion played a key
role in mobilizing people against external
threats. Indeed, nothing has proven more use-
ful for dehumanizing others and justifying hor-
rific acts of violence. What this means is that
Islamist terrorism cannot be regarded as sui
generis, although Islamism does differ in at least
three significant regards from most other
nativisms. First, Islamists may be anti-Western
but they are not anti-modern; indeed, as many
have noted, Islamists have nothing against
modern technology. Second, they belong to a
world religion whose reach is truly global,
which is ideal for helping terrorists recruit,
communicate, finance, orchestrate, advertise
and hide. Third, not only were nativists more
localized in the past, but techniques for defeat-
ing them almost always involved the applica-
tion of indiscriminate force—something that
will not work against these nativists unless we
want to play directly into Islamist hands. 
Islam itself, then, has to be considered a fac-
tor—the factor that nearly everyone shies
away from discussing. But so, too, are several
other factors that may be equally deep-seated
and even more difficult to disentangle: adoles-
cence, which affects all young men and there-
by funnels actors into this drama; and faction-
alism, which lurks in all societies and guaran-
tees nativists support. These are the enabling
factors of concern to us here. And again, while
the sources of grievance most often raised in
discussions of Islamic terrorism—authoritari-
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anism and poverty—surely deserve attention,
to focus solely on what people don’t have caus-
es us to miss what people remain attached to
and will fight to the death to protect.
Corporate loyalty, spiritual hunger and the
need to prove moral worth are just some of the
drives that can inspire acts of self-sacrifice.
When it comes down to it, few people are
motivated to fight solely by hate or fear; what
they’re fighting for likewise matters, particu-
larly when corporate religious identity is at
stake. 
Many conclusions follow from this
sketch. First, if authoritarianism is an
enabler but not the core cause of the threat
we face, it follows that democratizing the
Middle East, were it possible, will not solve
the problem. It may ameliorate it, but it
might also make things worse (of which
more in Part II). Second, if Islamist radical-
ism is a nativist reaction born of a fierce
desire to protect corporate Muslim identity,
it follows that corporate identity will increas-
ingly matter and that no sharp line dividing
“radicals” from “moderates” can be stable.
Since moderates may be radicalized at any
point, strategies based on a clear distinction
between the two are untenable. Third, once
we understand nativist movements, it should
become evident that the assumption that
Islamists are motivated primarily by negative
feelings of inferiority is wrong—a conclu-
sion with first-rank implications for deter-
mining our communications strategies in
the Arab and Muslim worlds.
But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Let us
first unpack the thesis and approach Islamist
terrorism from an anthropological perspective.
Let us discuss adolescence and factionalism, the
dialectic between Westernization and accom-
modation that gives rise to religiously infused
nativism itself, and Islamism as a particular case
in point.
Adolescence
It is an elemental observation of anthropol-ogy that organized violence might not exist,
and certainly could not long persist, without
young males. This simple fact too often goes
unspoken. Without ample supplies of young
men attracted to violence, Afghanistan, Iraq
and Palestine would be different sorts of
places. Arguments which assume that adoles-
cent males act violently only because they feel
alienated, bitter, frustrated or even just anx-
ious ignore the evidence. While violence does
offer a release for rage, resentment, repression
and pent-up hormonal urges, and while
aggression can earn those who are good at it
loot, booty, sex, higher status and respect,
weapons and the instruments of violence
themselves hold a certain fascination.
Adrenaline rushes are fun, no matter their
source.
We would be wise to approach the young
male-organized violence nexus by reconsidering
the contours of adolescence more broadly. As
Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox have noted, there is
a universal bio-grammar to all human soci-
eties.1 Ideally, adolescence represents the period
during which young males are supposed to
rebel in order to be socialized. Cleverly con-
structed societies channel male aggression out-
ward and into institutions (e.g., warriordom,
monasteries, universities) where they can do lit-
tle social harm but still test the limits of their
capabilities and others’ reactions. Because learn-
ing how to lead and follow—or to manipulate
and respond to social dynamics—can only real-
ly be done among peers, young men group (or
are grouped) together.
For better or worse, such groups generate
their own sets of internal tensions from which,
in communal societies especially, there is no
escape. In these settings youth are hemmed in
by a finite number of prospective roles, set soci-
etal expectations, a pre-determined cast of
adults, and peers who will likely remain peers
for life. This may help explain differences in
mutual expectations among young adults raised
in places like Pakistan as against young adults
8 THE AMERICAN INTEREST
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1Tiger and Fox, The Imperial Animal (Transaction,
1997 [1971]).
There is a universal
bio-grammar to all
human societies.
raised in more atomizing environments like
Lodi, Lackawanna or Leeds, and the yearning
that the latter often feel for the tight peer com-
munities the former seem to have. 
As for emotions stirred up during adoles-
cence, most seem to be more intense versions
of those felt during childhood, but associated
with more and different targets. These include
disgust, humiliation, outrage, the need to
prove ourselves and be taken more seriously,
but also desire, love, compassion and the need
to be useful. Physicality takes on a new
urgency, especially for males. Intensity is some-
times sought for its own sake—ergo drugs—
though quests on behalf of causes can prove
equally exhilarating.
Just having or collecting experiences seems
to help adolescents. Different experiences not
only help youth learn but also to establish track
records. Handled correctly, any type of experi-
ence can be counted as an achievement.
Experiences earn youth bragging rights and,
transformed into “war stories”, help impress
peers or girls (as well as other key audiences:
younger kids and older men). But storytelling
also fuels one-upmanship. With the glue for
virtually all groups being shared experiences,
the more hardship, misery, daring and even
foolishness that is shared the better. Danger
helps. So does skirting the edge of what is
socially allowed. Illicitness holds cachet, while
in tandem secrecy and camaraderie reinforce
each other’s mystique.
Camaraderie is both much simpler and more
complex than is often realized. First, it provides
purpose. Second, group dynamics act as a goad
to experimentation. Third, strength in numbers
makes potential consequences seem less conse-
quential. In a sense, and because they focus on
the future, adolescents are all about progress:
Novelty is not just good, but the highest good.
To belong to a group solves the problem of
what to do, while doing stuff—anything—
helps generate the next idea and, ultimately, the
next “adventure.” Vandalism is one typical kind
of by-product: It provides a rush of excitement
for individuals, an activity for the group and
memories to bond by. What is destroyed is
immaterial. Why is even harder to explain. 
Given the importance of belonging to a
group, it is small wonder that one of the most
difficult balancing acts in adolescence is learn-
ing how to stand out and fit in. No one wants
to be odd man out. To avoid such a fate
requires conforming. Yet to be indispensable
one has to bring something of one’s own to
the table. No formula exists for how to pull
off being different but not too different, and
similar but not too similar to others in the
group, as every group has its own composi-
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The Bio-grammar of Baby-talk
The idea that IDS [infant-directed speech] is not primarily about language is support-ed by the universality of its musical elements. Whatever country we come from and
whatever language we speak, we alter our speech patterns in essentially the same way
when talking to infants. . . . It is evident that those who use facial expression, gestures
and utterances to stimulate and communicate with their babies are effectively moulding
the infants’ brains into the appropriate shape to become effective members of human
communities, whether we think of those as families or societies at large. Parents largely
do this on an intuitive basis—they do not need to be taught IDS—and use music-like
utterances and gestures to develop the emotional capacities of the infant prior to facili-
tating language acquisition.
—Steven Mithren, The Singing Neanderthals:
The Origins of Music, Language, Mind and Body (Harvard University Press, 2006)
tion and chemistry. This is why so much of
what adolescent males learn has to be experi-
ential.2 But what camaraderie also makes pos-
sible is belonging to something bigger and
more important than oneself. Losing oneself
to a group or a cause—especially in combina-
tion—not only helps an individual to tran-
scend the mundane, but also to feel signifi-
cant. This may be all the more important for
adolescents, when hormones wreak havoc
with mind/body relations, and transcending
one’s body, one’s age, and adults’ expectations
holds ineffable appeal.
Escape is always possible through art, music,
drama and sports if these are available, although
they can also prove problematic. To earn recog-
nition and keep advancing, one has to be suffi-
ciently talented. Otherwise, why continue to
compete? “Why bother?”—that classic teen
response to whatever teens cannot or do not
want to do—signals something else: rejection
or rebellion. This is the flip side of sublimating
oneself to something large and noble. If we
think about how adolescents often view them-
selves—as trapped between being freer than
children but not as autonomous as adults—
then why not try to seize rewards early, by what-
ever means available? This explains some of the
allure of crime, war and violence. But on the
other hand, why seek material rewards at all?
Why not eschew possessions? Asceticism can
lend itself to even greater flights of self-right-
eous fancy.3
Often adolescents do things just to test their
limits. How much can they feel, and make oth-
ers feel? Sometimes, the more someone else
seems to feel, the more this drives others to imi-
tate him. Intensity—the great evanescent
elixir—works like a sump. But on whom it
works, how and to what ends, especially in het-
erogeneous societies, is impossible to predict.
It is possible that the motivator for suicide
terrorism, for instance, is as simple (but pro-
found and quintessentially adolescent) as “I’ll
show you.” But it could also be that suicide on
behalf of a cause represents something so dar-
ing, so extreme, so final and so explosive that,
for those seeking the ultimate, this is it almost
by definition. Because the same act can satisfy
any of a number of feelings or yearnings (yearn-
ings being even more inchoate than feelings), it
seems unlikely we will ever figure out what
entices or drives adolescent X to commit act Y.
The trigger could be anything from a personal
insult to the televised plight of imagined com-
rades. Herein lies the diabolical cleverness of
this method of tapping into adolescents:
Adolescents are not just prone to violence
because violence seems to deliver what they
want, but they also prime one another. 
One would think, given our own personal
experiences—never mind the historical, cross-
cultural record—that we would better appreci-
ate what traditional (especially tribal) societies
have long recognized: Adolescence itself is a big
social problem. Traditional societies would
never have developed or bothered to perfect
lengthy rites of passage and methods of social
control to domesticate young men if there were
not some pressing need to have done so. That
need remains. Not that grievances do not mat-
ter in contemporary affairs between the Muslim
world and the West—but it is far more impor-
tant for us to understand that the reason they
matter, and how they are expressed, has every-
thing to do with adolescence.
When does adolescence begin and end?For an anthropologist the answer is
obvious: whenever society says so. Most tradi-
tional societies demarcate entry and exit with
10 THE AMERICAN INTEREST
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The main motivator for
suicide terrorism may be
as simple as the adolescent
quip, “I’ll show you.”
2Lionel Tiger, Men in Groups (Random House,
1969).
3As do veganism and numerous forms of environ-
mentalism, which fit with the kind of holier-
than-thou attitude adolescents with no real
responsibilities can afford to adopt. Alter-
natively, adolescents who lack the luxury of
being able to reject something they do not have
(e.g., lots of stuff ) can be just as self-righteous
about poverty as a virtue.
specific rites. Along with new sets of roles,
responsibilities and rewards may come new
dietary restrictions, new forms of dress, new
codes of behavior and a new place of residence
(something we see, by the way, in most mili-
taries). But in modern societies there are no
clear gates through which young men must pass
in order to advance. This means that individu-
als can stay in prolonged (or arrested) adoles-
cence as long as they want and are financially
able. We see such individuals all around us, not
just in the United States, but in growing mid-
dle classes worldwide. And if we look back at
social rebels and revolutionaries through time,
we see that most caught fire during adolescence
and many remained firebrands their entire
lives.
We are all familiar with the division of rad-
ical labor that generally results as time passes:
As rebels age they instigate rather than partic-
ipate in violence. They theorize, rationalize,
finance, orchestrate and direct. Of course,
some extremist intellectuals might never have
engaged in violence, while aging thugs may
still routinely participate in violent acts; but
we see the basic pattern over time and across
cultures. Now we see it increasingly in Muslim
societies, as these societies collide with mod-
ernizing influences worldwide. One obvious
conclusion from this is that age affects males
in similar ways. If so, then perhaps the best
societies can do is to redirect male energy
when (and as) it spikes. But even were we to
(re)recognize the need to better control young
males, we would still need to also do some-
thing about the second of our enablers, which
is independent of age: the urge to factionalize.
Factionalization
Young males are not the only ones to group;they simply behave differently in peer
groups than they do when they mix with the
rest of us. All societies are riven by factions.
Factions arise from personal rivalries writ into
principles. It does not matter which comes first,
genuine disagreement or interpersonal antipa-
thy. Actors themselves may not know. But the
process is clear: To make something out of a
rivalry, to create or rally a faction, Person A
must oppose something associated with Person
B—a position, belief, something he can point to
as significantly and discernibly different.
Significance, difference and disernability are all
important. To attract and retain supporters,
Person A and his lieutenants must ensure that
others can see for themselves that B’s differ-
ences from them do matter. Ideally, these
should matter in substantive or symbolically
resonant ways. 
Another way to explain the dynamic is to
consider two factions. Because members of A
hate members of B on principle, members of A
should dislike everything members of B stand
for. But members of A are only likely to attract
recruits and allies if they can de-personalize and
then moralize what is at stake. Once “on princi-
ple” is turned into “for the sake of principle”
potential friends do not need direct experience
with A’s enemies to be asked for support. But
also, with the shift from hating people for no
good reason to hating them for good reason, it
is just a short slide to being able to dehumanize
them altogether and slaughter them in large
numbers. Other factors facilitate this process,
but for now it is enough to observe how circu-
lar the process of factionalization usually is:
Members of A convince themselves that B’s
principles are deserving of hate, even though it
was really specific members of B whose behav-
ior led members of A to infer what those odious
principles were in the first place.
We see this circular process of factionaliza-
tion in the schisms that have wracked
Christianity, as well as in splits among social
revolutionaries. (It certainly holds true in acade-
mia, which should not be surprising since to
produce conflict out of the “narcissism of small
differences” takes prodigious efforts at intellec-
tualizing, rationalizing and justifying.) If one
steps back and objectively considers the early
debates within the Church, for instance, or
between the Church and the Lutherans, or the
Lutherans and the Reformed Church, it is hard
not to conclude that initial battles were fought
over relatively minor and even arbitrary issues.
Why care more about Trinitarian doctrine than
predestination, or predestination than infant
baptism? The amount of time, effort and single-
mindedness that was devoted to turning just
one matter into a breakpoint is astounding. No
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less impressive is the relentlessness of the logic
that was applied by each side. All of this sug-
gests that theologians and Church intellectuals
positively sought out points on which they
wanted to differ from others, knowing that their
opponents would oblige their desire for faction. 
It is understandably difficult to find person-
al rivalry cited as the impetus for factionaliza-
tion, for that would make defenders of differ-
ence seem petty and insufficiently principled.
But finding examples of rivalry at work once
factions exist is easy. For instance, in his history
The Reformation, Diarmaid MacCulloch writes:
“ . . . it was what Calvin or the Reformed
believed that decided what mainstream
Lutheranism would pronounce as orthodoxy. If
Calvin had affirmed it, then they were against
it. . . .” Or, because the non-Catholic English
sought to exploit the Irish, the Irish were bound
to stick to and even make more of their
Catholicism. Such reactions are so common-
place that we tend to accept the fact that, when
one group tries to subjugate or influence anoth-
er there is bound to be resistance. We pay less
attention to what is used as the bone of con-
tention, than to how it is used. Whatever the
bone is, it may well have mattered less than peo-
ple now believe it did. It may even have been
invented.4 For instance, the more 19th-century
French philosophes looked to Ancient Rome as
their model, the more their British and German
counterparts then looked to Ancient Greece.
Each side used one set of differences to sharpen
another, though any of them could have laid
claim to either tradition.
Mau Mau, in contrast, offers an exampleof what happens when a difference that
always mattered suddenly matters more. It is
just one of many cases that highlights what
happens when Westerners seek to change
things that non-Westerners consider integral to
their identity and moral well-being. In the
mid-1900s, Christian missionaries attempted
to squelch certain local practices—like female
circumcision—among the Kikuyu in Kenya.
This turned female circumcision into a rallying
point, and it became one of the sparks that fed
the Mau Mau fires of rebellion. But on closer
examination what else do we find beneath this
grievance? We find factions.
Some Kikuyu were Christian and others
were becoming Christian. Christianization
clearly posed a threat to local healers and other
purveyors of local traditions who had a vested
interest in maintaining the old ways—so of
course we would expect them to resist
Christianity. Likewise we might expect tradi-
tionalists to make more of traditions, both to
rally allies and to prove their own worth.
However, digging deeper, the willingness of
many Kikuyus to become Christian in the first
place suggests that Kikuyu society was never
completely united. The potential for factions to
crystallize already existed; all the missionaries
did was introduce a new issue over which fac-
tions could coalesce.
There were plenty of such issues at the time in
Kenya. No less threatening than Christianization
was how land was being commodified, the
socio-economic differences introduced by
money, and more besides. Change itself was not
the issue, for that would suggest that Kikuyu
society had always been as it was and had never
adopted new practices—something that does
not hold for any group of people anywhere. No;
it was what was changing that mattered, which
explains why female circumcision in particular
came to be such a sticking point. Kikuyu tradi-
tions were critical to keeping Kikuyus Kikuyu
because identity is always a matter of practices
as well as beliefs. How else can people make
beliefs visible? This is exactly what female cir-
cumcision helped do: It both literally and figu-
ratively marked young women as Kikuyu and
distinguished them from the uncircumcised,
unclean members of neighboring tribes.
Corporate integrity was thus tied to this rite, as
was, Kikuyus believed, the long-term health
and fertility of their society.
This is the pattern that produces traditional-
ists everywhere. When an outsider threatens a
critical practice essential to corporate integrity,
he not only directly threatens the group, but
does so by making splits visible within the
group over who values these things more. We
see this not just in Kenya, but over and over
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again in our own encounters with American
Indians. 
Indian tribes were divided not just thanks to
outsiders, but according to blood ties and fam-
ily relationships. Some families stuck together
no matter what, and continued to dislike others
no matter what. The dynamic that unfolded
with white encroachment was that whichever
tribal faction decided to be accommodationist
first guaranteed that its rivals would turn tradi-
tionalist or nativist. Obviously, those willing to
abandon Indian identity were not particularly
committed to tradition in the first place, which
proved particularly ideal for outsiders since this
made distinguishing between “friendlies” and
“hostiles” itself congruent with acculturation.5
How this fanned the flames of nativism can be
seen in the following description of the Iroquois
in the early 1800s:
. . . emotion drove many of the members
of the pagan party into extremely
nativistic positions. Since the missionar-
ies were demanding the abandonment of
an Indian identity and calling the con-
servatives by the opprobrious term
‘pagan’, some of those who chose to
retain pride in being Iroquois felt forced
to oppose everything any missionary
proposed—not merely psalm-singing
and sabbath-keeping, but also secular
schooling and even further material
improvements.6
Or, to be schematic about it: Once accommo-
dationists chose to abandon communal sensi-
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5American authorities not only recognized the sig-
nificance of intra- (and not just inter-) tribal
factionalism, but used it to their advantage as
often as they could. Whenever nativists
attempted to organize any sort of pan-Indian
movement, the U.S. govermment supported
regionally or tribally-based movements in order
to keep Indians divided. See Gregory Evans
Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North
American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).
6Anthony Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the
Seneca (Vintage Books, 1972 [1969]), p. 331.
bilities, nativists were duty-bound to defend
against accommodation. 
These splits between accommodationists
and nativists survive on Indian reservations in
the United States to this day. We also see them
at work abroad when, for instance, family or
clan A in Iraq or Afghanistan wants democracy
(or wants to “work with us”). This essentially
guarantees that family or clan B, to oppose
them, will reject democracy and everything
associated with it (and us), and will turn
increasingly nativist in the process.
Accommodationism and
Nativism
Factionalism may be no less a function ofbeing social than adolescence is a function
of being human. The two, of course, are also
linked since adolescents invariably get used by
factions. Somewhat less clear is why adolescents
would avow nativist positions, given their pen-
chant for novelty and change. But here is where
the Indian Wars again become instructive. 
Young warriors never fought to become
white, only to stay Indian. At the same time,
Indian youth were not just fighting against
change and for glory or immediate gratifica-
tion. Often, even though they would not have
put it this way, they were fighting for something
larger and more noble than themselves. Leaders
like Captain Jack of the Modoc or Chief Joseph
of the Nez Perce said as much: Better to die as
an Indian than live as a white man. In other
words, it wasn’t just a way of life nativists were
fighting to preserve. From their perspective,
what they were defending was the only right or
true way to live. 
We need to be clear: Nativism is not a reac-
tion against change per se. It is a response to
accomodationists within the nativists’ own
camp (however defined) whose willingness to
change abrades on certain traditions and beliefs
that threaten corporate identity and the way
people should live. Preeminently, it is
Westernization that detonates this sort of con-
flict within non-Western societies.
What we in the West tend not to appreciate
sufficiently is that what makes us Western—
democracy, capitalism, scientific rationalism, our
notion of universal human rights and so on—is
historically anomalous. It is the exception, not
the rule. Our notion that the individual should
be the principal unit of moral and political
account is the source of our difference.
Exploration, science, none of the things we con-
sider integral to the development of the West
would have been likely had individuals not been
encouraged to compete against one another. Nor
could personal progress have become (somewhat
ironically) our greatest collective ambition. But
as David Gress points out in his history of “the
West”, our individualism and the achievements
it has made possible has a downside. What he
describes as an “acquisitive mentality combined
with the tendency to view everything through
quantitative, economic spectacles” is completely
antithetical to maintaining harmony, which is
the preeminent goal in tradition-oriented soci-
eties.7 In Arabic, for example, there is a highly
loaded and critically important term for the
absence of harmony, a state of being Muslims
seek to avoid at nearly all costs: fitna.
Even the most benign version of liberal cap-
italism generates problems for non-Western
societies, where redistribution rather than accu-
mulation is generally seen to be the highest
good, where the conspicuous display of any-
thing is frowned upon, and where individual
well-being is secondary to the well-being of the
group. Where harmony is the ideal, social rela-
tions matter. Contrast that with the West,
where we may all be headed forward in the
same general direction but do not feel tied
together in nearly the same way. 
We in the West, and particularly we in
America, underestimate the importance of soli-
darity as an ideal—an ideal that, as the dynam-
ics of factionalization suggest, will always matter
to some members of the group more than to
others. The great social scientists of Europe—
Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Simmel, Tonnies—
picked up on the radical disjunctures intro-
duced by changes in scale, from gemeinschaft to
gesellschaft, or from village to city. Numerous
others—Polanyi, Schumpeter, O’Neill—have
charted the agonizing social adjustments and
tradeoffs that the early modern West endured.
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We understand something, too, of the social-
psychological character of the romantic reaction
to the early decades of the Industrial
Revolution. We have an inkling of what
Westernization did in and to the West. Why,
then, are we so oblivious to what Westernization
is doing in and to the non-West? 
Though Westernization’s effects vary accord-
ing to place, the same overall principles apply:
Generally speaking, people are much more like-
ly to absorb Western practices piecemeal, at
their own pace, so long as they can do so with-
out feeling themselves fundamentally changing.
This has several implications. For one, it means
that entire societies do not acculturate all at
once or on their own. Either some coercive
authority from without, or alternatively some
faction from within, has to apply pressure. But
then, as soon as pressure to change is felt, and as
soon as some portion of the community begins
to change behavior in ways that seem to threat-
en the identity of the corporate “whole”, tradi-
tionalists react and people turn to them in order
to help them resist.
Westernization, which represents the most
consistently aggressive (but only fitfully violent)
transformative force in human history, pro-
duces some variant of these effects everywhere.
This means that the threshold for people recog-
nizing that they have changed (or have been
changed) too much—from what they were into
what they now are—is hard to detect. Once
begun, it cannot be clear in the slow process of
acculturation when the point of no return is
reached. As with the famous metaphor of the
frog in boiling water, all societies recognize
acute crises and have mechanisms for dealing
with them; few have mechanisms for dealing
with non-acute but prolonged disaster. 
When people do finally recognize they are in
serious trouble, they typically turn backwards
and try to scrabble back up the slippery slope.
They also look outwards. Invariably, tradition-
alists will call for purification—of people, rites,
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instruments, ideas—to restore what was. But at
the same time, because the crisis is both new
and ambiguous, there is always some degree of
syncretism, or borrowing from without. Those
bent on not changing will wind up changing
certain things in order not have to change what
they regard as most sacred or essential. Thus,
what outsiders may consider hypocritical is not;
traditionalists will not reject everything
Western, but only those practices they believe
disrupt social relations and thereby morally or
spiritually endanger them—ergo the use of per-
fectly acceptable 21st-century weapons to
restore 7th-century values. 
As a process, acts of purification and restora-
tion typically take time, and here is where tradi-
tionalists encounter difficulties: They run out of
time. We see this especially clearly, again, in
American Indian history. By the time nativist
leaders rallied, splits among tribes and factions
within tribes were already too entrenched. Also,
whites kept pushing—demographically, diplo-
matically, militarily, economically, religiously.
The onslaught was overwhelming. Given the
realities of the day, complete Indian control
over the conditions of their acculturation was
impossible. Even so, they put up a considerable
fight:
Indian prophets arose not singly but in
groups, and in doing so they integrated
dissidents of various peoples into far-
flung and often militant networks. . . .
The shared understanding, by peoples of
widely separated regions, of symbols
whose meanings sprang out of deeper
understandings of the workings of the
world, provided an essential principle for
the pan-Indian movement of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies. The principle was that the power
of the British and Anglo-American
invaders could be met with sacred
power.8
Why Islam?
This should sound familiar. It could almostbe a description of al-Qaeda, except that
al-Qaeda possesses advantages the Indians
never had (as we’ll see). Between encroach-
ment, forced assimilation, and conversion to
Christianity, we basically forced Indians to
fight. In the Islamist case, conversion is less of
a worry than corruption and the irreversible
diminishment of Islam, as Islam defines itself. 
Islamists are loath to see Muslims treat Islam
the way Christians treat Christianity. They fear
that young Muslims will adopt the typical
Western mode of thought toward faith, substi-
tuting mere religion for a way of life, and privi-
leging materialism over spirituality. One way,
then, in which Islamists fight the diminution of
Islam is to make sure that Muslim faith, identi-
ty and behavior are indistinguishably inter-
twined. In this way they not only live up to and
embody Muhammadan ideals, but help distin-
guish Islam from other social systems. 
The French anthropologist Emmanuel
Todd has explored the tightness of some of
these linkages more boldly than most.9 As he
puts it, “once removed from its anthropologi-
cal vector, a religion loses its strength and its
ability to resist other doctrines.” He identifies
the anthropological vector for Muslims as “the
endogamous community family.” While what
he specifically refers to might be too much of
an idealized type, extended families or lineag-
es, not individuals, do remain the unit of
account and accountability throughout the
Middle East and beyond. Islam does nothing
to break down communal bonds; instead it
seeks to expand them to the entire umma, and
the ubiquity of bloodprice, bridewealth,
honor killings and other customary institu-
tions bear witness to the power and pull of col-
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lective obligations and responsibilities. From
this perspective it should be evident that what
threatens Islam’s vector—the primacy of the
group over the individual—is individuation,
which is Westernization’s vector. 
Of course, Islamists do not explain their
reaction to Westernization in quite these terms.
But they do stress the superiority of their reli-
gious values and way of life over ours, and
despite the almost endless Western commen-
tary that emphasizes their hatred, hostility, dis-
illusionment, humiliation, envy, fear and
resentment, Islamist fervor is very much for
Islam, not just against us. If we would only lis-
ten more closely to Muslims themselves, we
would hear a different set of negative judgments
than those we keep hearing from Western com-
mentators (and their Freudian interpreters).
Many of these judgments have to do with revul-
sion. Take our profligate Western practices and
behaviors concerning human sexuality, for
instance. Many Muslims consider them sinful,
disgusting and an affront. It is not jealousy that
they generate, but disdain. Unfortunately,
because this does not square with what we think
Muslims should feel, we miss why Islamists
view us as corrosive agents, and a contaminant
that demands removal. 
Interestingly, the traditional method for
combating evil, whether it comes in the form of
temptation, corruption, contamination or pol-
lution, is to exorcise and purify—exactly what
nativists prescribe in order to revitalize society.
It is no coincidence that the Ayatollah
Khomeini spoke of the “de-toxification” of
Muslim society from its Western habits.
Revitalization itself is useful because it either
helps unite large numbers of people or, alterna-
tively, separates out those weak enough to suc-
cumb to acculturation from those strong
enough to resist. This, in turn, can yield an
increasingly self-righteous nativist core which,
to prove its points, will engage in ever greater
acts of cleansing, purification and self-sacrifice.
In the current context this, too, helps explain
suicide terrorism. 
Over time, many Indian tribes also gave up
on what Geoffrey Parker calls “the etiquette of
atrocity”—and indulged in terror acts.10
Protestants and Catholics did the same in the
Thirty Years’ War. So did the leaders of the
Taiping Rebellion. So did French and
Communist revolutionaries. Indeed, the litera-
ture suggests that organized forces unleash ter-
ror and engage in atrocities for a range of rea-
sons, most of them surprisingly specific. 
Sometimes when one side cannot draw its
opponent into the kind of battle where it can
impose its will, atrocities occur. Atrocities are
also likely at the hands of undisciplined or ill-
disciplined forces that may engage in one-
upmanship among themselves. This would be
more typical of gangs than armies. But mili-
taries also tend to act restrained whenever there
is the likelihood of negotiating an end to the
war. Then it is better to be nice than nasty, not
only because you want to negotiate from a posi-
tion of moral strength, but because the fighting
can always recur and you might end up on the
wrong end of a bayonette. 
If, however, a war involves identity, and
combatants fear that their whole community
will be wiped out if they lose, distinctions
between combatants and non-combatants not
only become irrelevant to them, but everyone
who represents the other side is presumed to
pose a threat and has to be considered fair
game. Not surprisingly, “no mercy” is exactly
the attitude we see displayed in virtually all reli-
gious wars in the past, where the “polluting
enemy” was considered “outside the range of
human beings to whom one owes the slightest
obligation as fellow creatures.”11 This suggests
that where notions of moral pollution loom
large we should expect to see the dehumaniza-
tion and demonization of enemies, atrocities
and what we would regard as sickening cruel-
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Islamist fervor is very
much for Islam, not
just against us.
ties. Terrorism, therefore, need not signal weak-
ness, desperation or a lack of conventional capa-
bility only: It could instead reflect a deep-seated
response to fears of contagion and pollution.
To the extent this describes nativist reactions
and is one set of motives behind al-Qaeda (and
who-knows-how-many enemies to come), we
face a challenge we have met before—on our
own soil, a long time ago. However, one critical
difference worth remarking here (with more to
come in the next
issue) is that those
who fought to
stay communal















That, as much as
anything, is what
ultimately helped
the West subdue non-Western peoples. It’s what
also helped Americans shatter successive pan-
Indian movements in North America. In con-
trast, the Islamist enemies we face today not
only have all of these means and more, but they
also possess a sophisticated, even intimate
familiarity with us. Couple that with the specter
of their attaining weapons of mass destruction
and this may not be just a long war, but an
increasingly difficult one.
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This al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia
poster from this past win-
ter’s Iraqi election campaign
links participation in
Western-inspired democrat-
ic processes with apostasy to
Islam. The banner across the
top is the last part of a
Quranic verse (Surat Al-
Maida, verse 44), which
translates, “Whosoever does
not judge according to what
God has sent down, those
are the infidels.” The four
Arabic words on the road-
way leading through the
scorched landscape to the
broken cross translate as
“constitution”, “democra-
cy”, “elections”, and “un-
belief.”
Nativists and Accommodationists: An Iranian Case
The state of Muslim society today is such that . . . false saints prevent Islam from exert-ing its proper influence; acting in the name of Islam, they are inflicting damage upon
Islam. The roots of this group that exists in our society are to be found in the centers of
the religious institution. . . . They will oppose anyone who tells the people: “Come now,
awaken! Let us not live under the banners of others! Let us not be subject to the imposi-
tion of Britain and America! Let us not allow Israel to paralyze the Muslims!” . . . Do not
keep silent at a time when Islam is being destroyed, Islam is being wiped out. . . .
—Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
Program for the Establishment of an Islamic Government (1970)
